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AMERICAN VS. CANADIAN IDEOLOGY: 
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
Jeffrey Paul 
Introduction 
Americans and Canadians are often 
described as two of the world's more similar 
peoples. Most Americans would be hard-
pressed to find meaningful differences between 
themselves and Canadians, and usually must 
resort to a comparison of beer preferences or 
tastes in winter sports. Even business-orient-
ed Americans who keep abreast of the interna-
tional scene find it hard to say anything posi-
tive or meaningful about Canadian-American 
differences. Canadians, likewise, find it hard to 
describe how they differ from Americans, 
though being a North American minority has 
forced them to entertain this question more 
seriously than have their American brethren. 
Canadians will have a more practiced answer to 
this query, ranging from a fatalistic "We really 
aren't very different" to a statement about rel-
ative violence or conservatism. Still, the 
Canadian who faces this question will likely 
seem dissatisfied by his or her answer. 
When one turns to the political forum, a 
few differences between the North American 
countries stand out. America has for the most 
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part a two-party system of government while 
Canada has a multi-party, parliamentary system 
of government. Canada has paddled the waters 
of a comprehensive health-care system for 
years, while the U.S. government has remained 
deathly afraid of the issue. Ontario has recent-
ly installed a semi-socialistic policy of private-
sector wage fixing that has no parallel in the 
United States, while as recently as the 1960s all 
of Canada has been under martial law. But do 
these isolated, sometimes contradictory differ-
ences between American and Canadian people 
and institutions really mean anything? As sug-
gested above, many of us do not think so. 
This confusion does not arise from any seri-
ous lack of perception, but from the absence of 
any analytical tool for categorizing and describ-
ing these differences. Some specialists have been 
articulating for years the startling differences 
between the societies of the United States and 
Canada. To do this they have used a theoretical 
tool known as ideology. An ideology may be 
loosely described as a set of beliefs that define a 
nation's government, economics, and behavior 
towards other human beings. It has been 
assumed for years that the belief systems of 
Canada and the U.S. are fundamentally the same. 
But a reassessment of North American histori-
cal trends has convinced many writers that the 
two countries may, on the contrary, be ground-
ed in radically different belief systems. 
In this paper I propose first of all that the 
United States is ideologically what is known as 
"Liberal" through and through. 1 Secondly I 
propose that Canada, despite its adoption of 
many trappings of American "Liberalism," has 
at its base a set of beliefs and ideals fundamen-
tally distinct from the United States. I will pro-
vide support for these propositions by tracing a 
brief intellectual history of the interpretation 
of the Canadian ideology, followed by a histor-
ical narrative for the purpose of illustrating 
some central tenets of Canadian ideology. 
Thirdly, I propose that Canada, on account of 
its ideology, has an organic possibility for devel-
oping a true socialism, while the United States 
does not. Finally I offer some conclusions 
about future U.S.-Canadian economic and polit-
ical interactions. It should be noted that many 
of the arguments which I present in this paper 
have been made elsewhere and with greater 
attention to scholarly detail. Because these 
ideas form such an important conceptual tool 
for viewing the U.S.-Canadian situation, this 
presentation to a wider audience is warranted. 
But before any theoretical argument can be 
offered, an explanation of the concept of ideol-
ogy is in order. 
Ideology 
Ideology has been described above as a set 
of beliefs that define a nation's government, eco-
nomics, and behavior towards other human 
beings. Communism is an ideology, as is 
Fascism. The U.S. and the rest of the "free 
world" also have an ideology, first articulated in 
the writings of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. 
This philosophy is known to political scientists 
as "Liberalism." The ideology which a nation is 
given, adopts, or which evolves by itself shapes 
the history of that country. Germany, for exam-
ple, changed quite a bit when Hitler and his 
Fascists were elected to power, from a growing 
1Throughout this paper, the names of ideologies will be 
capitalized so as to avoid confusion. 
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western-style state into a country bristling for 
war and worse. Likewise, an ideology is shaped 
by the ideas and events that spring from a coun-
try with that ideology. In order to find the gen-
eral characteristics of Fascism, then, Mussolini's 
and Hitler's historical actions have been ana-
lyzed. The most useful aspect of an ideological 
analysis is the fact that general patterns and 
beliefs common to two or more countries can 
be sought out and compared to explain various 
phenomena, from class and interpersonal rela-
tions to government and corporate structuring. 
Why were China and North Korea so desirous 
of each other's friendship, and why are Germany 
and the U.S. currently so eager for a good rela-
tionship? Primarily because they have similar 
ideologies. When one turns to the relationship 
between the U.S. and Canada, however, things 
aren't so cut and dried. Historians and econo-
mists alike have assumed for years that the U.S. 
and Canada share a common ideology, that is, 
Liberalism. In recent decades some researchers 
have come to the conclusion that this comfort-
able assumption might not be accurate. 
The perceived problem lies not with any 
of the three ideologies mentioned above, but 
with a fourth, known as "Conservatism."2 
Conservatism, a term explored more fully 
below, is roughly synonymous with the French 
phrase ancien regime. It is a word used to 
describe the crotchety ancestor to our modern 
philosophy of Liberalism, as enshrined in the 
U.S. Constitution. The anti-monarchical 
American and French Revolutions signalled the 
end of the old system and the beginning of our 
age of Liberalism. Today, no major government 
actively espouses Conservatism, though snatch-
es of it do survive in countries with a history of 
this philosophy. The United States, uniquely 
among the Western democracies, is a country 
without a feudal, or Conservative, past. (See 
Lipset on Engels, p. 25) During the Revolution-
ary War those elements of American society 
that were truly Conservative (i.e., those who 
were loyal to the crown) were swept away. 
Swept where? Largely to Canada, where these 
2By more stringent definitions of ideology than the one 
presented in this study, Conservatism is not an ideology per 
se because it lacks the evangelical aspects of most others. 
For our less technical purposes, however, the term ideolo-
gy will more than suffice. 
loyalist refugees augmented a much older 
French Catholic, almost medieval, society. 
(Philips, p. 69) Already the stage for separate 
ideological destinies had been set. Let us now 
explore the development and characteristics of 
the American and Canadian ideologies so that 
they may be productively compared. 
America's Ideology 
America's national consciousness and many 
of her most pervasive myths were forged in the 
late eighteenth century, during Liberalism's fiery 
youth. In practical terms, Liberalism was at first 
an intellectual and then, in America, an actual 
revolt against the tenets and institutions of the 
Conservative ancien regime. What exactly are 
those tenets of Conservatism? In defining this 
philosophy, we can more readily understand its 
antithesis, Liberalism. 
A most obvious aspect of the ancien 
regime was its belief in a natural hierarchy, a 
caste system of nobles and commoners at the 
head of which stood a king. We can recall from 
grade school how abhorrent was the figure of 
King George III to the patriots. In America, 
then, no one was to be born inescapably high-
er than another. A man's merit would be based 
solely on his ability to reason, and the proudest 
title would not be earl or duke, but that of cit-
izen. (Herold, p. 29) 
Another hated aspect of the old Conserva-
tive order was its worship of the status quo and 
tradition. The Conservative orator and states-
man Edmund Burke expressed the basis of the 
Conservative's strong grounding in tradition 
when he said, "In the long term, mankind is 
wise .... In the short term, man is a fool." 
(Burke, p. 137) Locke, and with him the 
American founding fathers, saw this tradition-
alism as stagnating and a chokehold on the 
rational powers of man. They believed that tra-
dition was not necessary to prove an idea use-
ful; the only criterion for that need be its rea-
sonableness. Their revolution itself was 
attempting to establish a democracy, a govern-
mental form with no grounding in tradition 
whatsoever, for no democratic state had exist-
ed in the Western world since the time of 
Pericles's Athens. The Liberal patriots threw 
tradition to the wind, convinced that the ratio-
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nality of man would enable a democracy to sur-
vive and even to thrive. 
This substitution of Liberal rationality for 
the old Conservative traditions occurred not 
only in politics, but also in the sphere of eco-
nomics. In medieval and renaissance Europe, 
when what we call Conservatism was the only 
functioning ideology, what little trade did occur 
was monopolized by the hierarchy of the guilds. 
As a rule, no one could set up a business unless 
he was born into the right class and spent a 
mandatory number of years as a journeyman, 
no matter what talent or ideas he may have had. 
Only after a man had achieved the ceremonial 
rank of "Master" could he own his own shop, 
and even then his hands were tied by a stifling 
code of traditions. For example, a clothmaker 
in London was forbidden to produce more than 
thirty bolts of cloth per week, and it had to be 
dyed one of that week's specified colors, even if 
another color was selling like hotcakes. To the 
Liberals of the American revolution, these for-
malities seemed as absurd as they do to most of 
us. The new leaders swept away many vestiges 
of the feudal economy, and encouraged in its 
stead a modern market economy based upon 
individual initiative, the laws of supply and 
demand, and free competition. 
A third aspect of Conservatism against 
which the Liberals reacted violently was the view 
of society as a corporate whole. This view, which 
is difficult for many who are products of 
Liberalism to conceptualize, holds a man's worth 
at nought or, less than that, as irrelevant when 
he is considered outside of his society. To the 
Conservative philosopher, the individual meant 
nothing out of a societal context. The death of 
Socrates will help to illustrate this point. When 
offered the chance to escape from death at the 
hands of the Athenian government by living in 
exile, Socrates chose to die, because he believed 
that leaving the society with which he had will-
ingly coexisted simply because it did something 
he did not like was anarchic. Apart from his soci-
ety, Socrates was not truly human. In opposition 
to this idea, the Liberals believed in the individ-
ual worth of each man. All men are created equal, 
and each man has worth as an individual. In the 
Liberal ideology of the U.S. constitution, each 
man has the rights of an individual, while the old 
duties of a member of a body are downplayed. 
To restate, the American Fathers reacted 
against what they saw as the tyrannical and sti-
fling institutions of the ancien regime. They 
believed in equality and opposed hierarchy; they 
believed in the power of reason over the irra-
tionality of tradition; and they believed in the 
rights of the individual over the duties of the 
corporate slave. The degree or success to which 
any of these notions has been actualized in the 
history of the U.S. could and has been debated 
ad nauseam; but their pervasiveness in 
American history, and more importantly in 
American myth, still remains. The Pioneer, per-
haps the ultimate embodiment of individuality 
and equality and the search for a better life, 
dominated American culture through the turn 
of the twentieth century. In our own century 
Americans have raised the standard of individ-
ualliberty and progressive initiative whenever 
they have needed it most, such as in their fights 
against the forces and ideas of Communism and 
Fascism. The very Liberal idea of "business" as 
we know it is believed by most Americans to be 
one of the great trademarks of America. In 
short, these ideas always have and still do com-
prise the solid core of common American 
beliefs. In fact, these Liberal beliefs have so 
dominated her history that America has in 
effect become a mono-ideological state. 
The Canadian author Seymour Martin 
Lipset has quoted Richard Hofstaeder as saying, 
"It has been our (America's) fate as a nation not 
to have ideologies, but to be one." (Lipset, p. 19) 
Uniquely among the nations of the world, 
America has a galvanized set of beliefs by which 
someone or something may be labeled 
American or un-American. The Canadian 
author Gerard S. Vano argues that this set of 
ideas has been actively forged into America's 
national consciousness through the fighting of 
a revolution. It has become a true ideology 
because Americans have actively fought for 
these values throughout her history and have 
just as actively forced any incompatible ele-
ments of American society to assimilate into 
this ideal or be destroyed. Take the antebellum 
South as an example of this expurgating ten-
dency. Many historians have characterized that 
society as an essentially feudal one, and surely 
a good case can be made for this idea. During 
the first half of the nineteenth century, the 
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American North developed a Liberal economy 
and ideas, becoming de facto the living seat of 
the revolutionary ideology while a largely tra-
ditional plantation economy became 
entrenched in the South. When tensions 
reached a head, the old South was summarily 
swept away and replaced by mainstream 
American culture. The Plantationers came to 
share the fate of the Tory establishment of four 
score and seven years before. With the triumph 
of the North, Liberalism remained the core of 
American national culture. 
It can be readily argued, then, that 
America's ideology is known and fixed if such a 
thing can be known of any country. Perhaps, as 
will be seen below, America's ideology is the clos-
est thing to a "sure thing" in the field of ideolog-
ical study. The surety of American ideology is one 
thing upon which most of the pundits agree. 
This is not the case with Canada, howev-
er. Whereas America has a strong and focused 
ideology, Lipset goes so far as to claim that 
Canada has no ideology. (p. 57) Many authors 
still fit Canada comfortably into the sphere of 
Liberalism. Other writers have sifted through 
Canada's past and found a strong strain of old 
Conservatism, though few have agreed upon 
what to do with this. Have Canada's Conserva-
tive roots been completely buried? Have they 
been hybridized through contact with other 
ideologies? Does this strain reallyaffect Canada 
at all? Most authors do point out that Canada 
has undergone no active genesis or formative 
period where she forged an ideology of her own, 
as did the Americans at the time of their revo-
lution. This paper proposes that Canada's 
Conservative past is still very much with us, in 
somewhat evolved form, and it is to an elabo-
ration of this idea that we must now turn. 
What is Canada? 
Canadians have certainly adopted the more 
obvious traits of a Liberal state. If this were not 
the case, the inquiry pursued here would hard-
ly be necessary. Canada is a Liberal democracy, 
and her people enjoy the benefits of advanced 
technology, modernity, and generally higher liv-
ing standards just like Americans. (Vano, p. 22) 
She has played the world economics game so 
well that she has been admitted into the "Big 
Seven" club of advanced economies. But what 
has happened to the ardently Conservative 
Canada of the eighteenth century? Has it sim-
ply disappeared without a trace? As we shall see, 
entrenched ideologies seldom disappear unless 
they are actively eradicated. The Canadian 
author George Vano argues that "Canada has 
absorbed ... the most superficial (i.e. empirical-
ly evident) aspects of the liberal process." (Vano, 
p. 23) He continues: "In Canada no indigenous 
ideological respect for the components of 
Liberalism has been popularly ingrained 
because the derivative benefits of a truly Liberal 
system were obtained in Canada relatively eas-
ily by a process of osmosis from the Anglo-
American World." (Vano, p. 23) In short, some 
historians believe that those Liberal character-
istics by which many people tend to gauge 
Canada do not constitute a Canadian ideology, 
but are simply traits which have been grafted 
onto an older, Conservative base. Many Liberal 
historians have written without taking this ide-
ological consideration into account, and their 
theories have been Copernican in nature -
generally able to account for events and hap-
penings, but never thoroughly satisfying. Let 
us briefly sketch the chain of thought by which 
historians have discovered the un-Liberal streak 
in Canada's character. 
Ideological Interpretations 
Through the 1950s the seminal volumes 
on Canadian history were written under the 
assumption that Canada was a land rooted firm-
ly in the Liberal tradition. Creighton's 1937 
study, The Commercial Empire of the St. 
Lawrence, championed the "staples" theory of 
Canadian economy, which emphasized Canada's 
role as supplier of raw materials to the 
economies of Great Britain and the United 
States. (Vano, p. 26) In this view Canada was 
provincial and a bit of a backwater area, but it 
was assumed to be ideologically contiguous 
with the rest of the Western world. In the 1950s 
Careless's next-generational assessment, enti-
t led Canada, expanded upon Creighton's eco-
nomics themes but did not conceive of a shift 
in ideological interpretation. This is hardly 
surprising; the ingrained nature of an ideology 
is such that it is seldom questioned except by 
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revolutionaries such as the American Founding 
Fathers and the Bolsheviks. 
In 1957 the American Louis Hartz pub-
lished the groundbreaking volume The Liberal 
Tradition in America. Hartz proposed a new 
interpretation of American politics. Europe, 
Hartz realized, was the place of origin for both 
Conservatism and Liberalism. In a country such 
as Great Britain, both ideologies existed along-
side one another for a significant period of time. 
In time, Conservatism yielded to Liberalism, it is 
true; but the crux of Hartz's thesis lay in his pro-
posal that the organic European Socialist move-
ments were the modern carryovers of 
Conservative roots. In the European countries, 
Conservative traditions had mutated through 
their contact with Liberalism, melding aspects 
of both philosophies, to produce Socialism. To 
Hartz, therefore, organic Socialism was only pos-
sible in countries with a strong Conservative (i.e., 
feudal or neo-feudal) background. We may 
explain the Hartzian logic by hearkening back to 
our brief descriptions of Conservatism and 
Liberalism. The former philosophy is corporate, 
traditional, and hierarchical, while the latter is 
individual, rational, and egalitarian. If such is 
the case, Socialism can be described as corporate, 
rational and egalitarian. The Socialist shares 
with the Liberal the ideas of rationalism and 
equality, but holds the formerly conservative view 
that human beings are part of a corporate whole, 
and are therefore responsible for others and their 
betterment as much as for themselves. By a sim-
ilar argument Hartz showed Socialism to be the 
product of an interaction between the ideologies 
of Liberalism and Conservatism. 
To Hartz, the fact that the American 
mono-ideological culture has produced no seri-
ous Socialist movements came as little surprise, 
since organic Socialism seems to require an 
interaction of the corporate ideals of a 
Conservative tradition to counter the individu-
alism of the Liberals.3 Less than a decade after 
the publication of Hartz's book, the Canadian 
writer Gad Horowitz applied the technique of 
31 am speaking here of an effective organic Socialism. 
The example of F.D.R. and the New Deal era is often raised 
to counter the idea that the U.S. has no real Socialism. The 
actions of one administration do not by any means consti-
tute a grass roots movement. An event as simple as the pres-
idency of Eisenhower wiped a large portion of Roosevelt's 
legacy from effective existence. 
Hartzian analysis to Canada. He believed that 
because Canada has a tradition of true 
Conservatism as well as Liberalism, Canada, 
unlike the United States, has a real chance of 
developing beyond Liberalism into some form 
of Socialism. (Horowitz, p. 7) 
But this is beyond the present phase of our 
argument. For now it will suffice to note that 
some authors claim to have found a seriously 
un-Liberal (and therefore un-American) streak 
in Canada's ideology. Such a revelation would 
conceptually push Canada out of the circle of 
mainstream Liberal nations. Theories of this 
kind hinge upon the presence of a true 
Conservatism in the Canadian past which has 
somehow survived to the present day. To search 
for and trace that Conservatism, we must delve 
into Canada's rich and varied past. 
Conservatism in Canadian History 
Canada's initial population was composed 
of Conservative French Catholics, a population 
later augmented by an influx of Conservative 
British royalists from the American colonies. To 
trace the effects of this initial Conservatism 
through Canada's history we must have some 
understanding of the effects which a 
Conservative streak would have upon a country. 
First of all, some established and traditional hier-
archy might be present. In addition, a great def-
erence to authority might be characteristic of a 
Conservative country's people. Finally, and most 
importantly to the life of the nation itself, 
Conservative societies would tend to be very 
parochial and have a centrifugal tendency in 
direct opposition to the nationalistic tendencies 
of Liberalism. This last tendency arises from the 
fact that Conservatives tend to honor the tradi-
tional regional differences of an area without 
particular attention to the inefficiencies they cre-
ate, while the rational, efficiency-seeking 
Liberals strive to break down old barriers which 
stifle commerce and exchange. In the following 
historical analysis of Canada all three of these 
un-Liberal traits can be found in abundance. 
French Canada, which encompassed most 
of modern day Quebec and Ontario from the 
1540s until 1763, was certainly a Conservative 
society. (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and 
Newfoundland had been wrested from the 
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French by the British in 1710.) An aristocrat-
ic class, called seigneurs, constituted the land-
ed power base of the country. A priestly class 
directed philosophy, education, and morality 
towards the supremely Conservative Jesuit 
ideals of hierarchy and tradition. The govern-
ment of New France rested upon the shared 
power of both royal representatives and the 
clergy. Even Careless describes the "typical 
builder of New France" as a "fur trader and a 
Jesuit," calling the society of New France 
"authoritarian and hierarchical in character." 
(Careless, p. 61) As one author sums up, "Life 
in New France was not only European but 
almost medieval in character. There was no sys-
tem of representative government, such as 
appeared in New England .... " (Philips, p. 69) 
The British, who nominally controlled 
most of continental Canada after the French 
and Indian War, found themselves in the curi-
ous situation of being overlords to a French-
speaking group of territories. As tensions in the 
southern American colonies mounted, Britain 
realized that a stabilization of the conquered 
territories of Canada would be desirable. As a 
result, the Quebec Act of 177 4 was passed, 
which guaranteed the continuation of the 
Conservative seignorial system and French lan-
guage rights. From the outset, then, Britain 
conceived of Canada as a set of colonies where 
maintenance of the status quo was the most 
desirable policy. 
The first introduction of non-feudal ele-
ments into Canadian society occurred in the 
1780s with the oft-cited flight of the Tories from 
America after the Revolution. The Tories, who 
were loyal to the British crown, were a half-
Liberal, half-Conservative breed- too non-
Liberal to be tolerated by the American ideolo-
gy, and yet not as thoroughly ancien regime as 
the French Catholics. Religious and linguistic 
differences between the two groups moved the 
British government to divide continental 
British North American into Upper and Lower 
Canada, creating the ancestors of modern day 
Quebec and Ontario. The seignorial system was 
reaffirmed by the same legislation and was to 
exist as the legal form of landholding in Canada 
until 1825. Even then, a voluntary - as 
opposed to forced- forfeiture was introduced, 
where seigneurs were encouraged by various 
incentives to give up their feudal rights. The 
1830s and '40s saw an increase in British emi-
gration and a subsequent agitation for reform 
of the old system. Only in 1854 were the 
seigneurs, or lords, finally abolished as a land-
holding class. Through the 1850s and '60s a 
"deep misunderstanding continued to separate 
urban, profit-minded British businessmen from 
largely rural French farmers and professional 
men concerned with maintaining tradition." 
(Philips, p. 71) Through these times the British 
had continued their tradition of introducing no 
radical change in Canada, preferring to govern 
traditionally and conservatively. 
Only in 1867 did Canada become a self-
governing entity, pushed by the mother coun-
try over the objection of many maritime and 
other subjects. It was still not a sovereign state 
in the way of other western nations, and 
Canadians remained subjects of the British 
Empire. There was no revolution in Canada, 
only a gradual evolution. The population of the 
vast new country consisted of roughly one mil-
lion French Catholics, one million Irish 
Catholics and Protestants, and one million 
English and Scottish Protestants. These groups 
were known more for mutual suspicion than 
brotherly love. Three-fourths of the population 
was rural; and only Quebec, Montreal, and 
Toronto were worthy of being called cities. 
(Philips, p. 72) 
The "White Lie" 
Until this point our historical analysis has 
treated the lands that comprise the modern 
state of Canada as if they were intrinsically a 
whole, when in fact the histories of each 
province have been very different. Newfound-
land, Acadia-cum-New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, 
Prince Edward Island, Labrador, Quebec, 
Ontario, the Hudson's Bay area, and various and 
sundry islands (some of which are still French) 
have all been governed as independent territo-
ries, flying at various times the flags of France 
and Great Britain under such diverse magnates 
as bishops and trading companies. The 
Maritimes spent the years 1710-1763 under a 
different flag from the Canadian mainland. 
Newfoundland, from the beginning an integral 
part of Canadian settlement, only decided to 
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join the Canadian union in 1949. The Canadian 
provinces simply do not have a history of loyal-
ty to each other. Rather, like the disparate ter-
ritories of the medieval church, they looked to 
a more or less spiritual overlord who governed 
them wisely from afar. 
This strange conglomeration of peoples 
and ideas never had been and even in 1867 was 
not really a nation. A nation in the modern, 
Liberal sense must have a strong central gov-
ernment or focus that evokes common feelings 
of loyalty and obedience from its people. 
Canada, in contrast, more closely followed the 
old feudal model. Under the feudal system, a 
lord such as a duke or king might hold territo-
ries all over Europe which were more or less 
loyal to him irrespective of nationality. In the 
1300s the Gascons and Normans (of modern-
day France) felt more loyalty to their English 
King (who spoke French) than the King of 
France. The pope was the ultimate example of 
supernational loyalties. Through the renais-
sance, more than one-tenth the land of Europe 
felt more loyalty to the Roman pontiff than the 
king of whatever country in which it lay. 
Europe under the older Conservatism did not 
have strong, centralized nations.4 
The Canadas, as they were known, were a 
group of colonies and territories controlled by 
the same government as per the feudal model, 
which in Canada's case happened to be geo-
graphically contiguous. Each territory was 
more loyal to the British government than to 
any Canadian power. When it became conve-
nient for the British to have these colonies 
become self-governing, all of British North 
America excepting Newfoundland was chris-
tened the Dominion of Canada. This was 
accomplished despite considerable objection 
from the Maritime provinces, which preferred 
to remain under the largely absent British con-
trol. Thus, almost by default, Canada became 
a pseudo-nation. The signing of the Versailles 
Treaty of 1918 was the first time Canada was to 
represent herself in a major international 
4The rise of the absolute monarchies in the 17th and 
18th centuries spelled the end of true feudalism, of course; 
but the underlying Conservative premises remained more 
or less constant. The use of Conservatism to describe feu-
dal and monarchical ideals is an oversimplification, but does 
not substantively weaken the point of our argument. 
forum. Only in the 1950s did Canada realize 
that her ties with the U.S. might become more 
important than her old British ties. Today, 
Canada certainly displays the most important 
characteristics of a nation; yet Britain remains 
the spiritual home of English Canada, while 
France is re-emerging as the spiritual mentor 
of Quebec. For a nation, this is a surprisingly 
colonial mentality. 
Analysis 
Several Conservatively-influenced traits in 
Canadian history have been highlighted in the 
preceding narrative. A sanctioned aristocracy 
was in place in Canada through the mid-nine-
teenth century. Canadian deference to British 
authority was explicit up through the same 
time, and has been implicit through the pseu-
do-colonial mentality of today. More impor-
tantly, Canada has never developed a strong 
nationalism. Rather regionalism has always 
been the norm through the beginning of this 
century. A strong example of this is Quebec, 
which has been seriously considering secession 
ever since the Dominion was created. 
Supporting fully one-fourth of Canada's popu-
lation, including two of the largest cities, this 
unruly province represents a large piece of the 
Canadian pie. History has witnessed what hap-
pens to any American states that think of seces-
sion. The agitators would be dubbed rebels and 
promptly crushed to the tune of "Stars and 
Stripes Forever." Yet Canadians are very calm-
ly and cooly (at a national level) dealing with 
the possible dissolution of their country as if it's 
not a terribly big deal. One may well argue that 
Canadians do this because of their regional loy-
alties and lack of a true nationalism, i.e., 
because they have inherited an ideology laced 
with Conservatism. 
Perhaps more important than what has 
happened in Canadian history for our purpos-
es is what has not happened. That is, Canada 
has never undergone a trial or crisis which has 
focused her ideology, or forced a change or a 
dramatic step. The British takeover in 1763 was 
for the most part an exchange of documents. 
The same can be said for the colony's change of 
status into a self-governing dominion. Fifty 
years after this change, Canada was represent-
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ing herself at international functions. Fifty 
years after the beginning of international rep-
resentation she promulgated a new constitu-
tion which no one really likes. In the absence 
of national turmoil or external pressure, Canada 
has simply coasted along, retaining the same 
Conservative roots with which she was born 
picking up choice bits of Liberalism along th~ 
way. Or as Vano puts it: 
Nor did incentive to liberalize Canada 
exist: why bother with the enormous 
discomfort of socio-ideological read-
justment like that which elsewhere 
attended the triumph of Liberalism? 
Why bother, when the superficial 
benefits could be so readily possessed 
without comparable sacrifice -
without civil and revolutionary wars, 
without those acts of public violence 
so absolutely essential to the fusion 
of diverse, often contradictory values 
into a single, logically consistent 
Liberal value system? (Vano, p. 23) ' 
Such is a partial case for the discernment 
of Conservatism in the Canadian mindset. It is 
important when considering this argument not 
to equate Canadian regionalism with weakness. 
As Liberals, Americans are predisposed to dis-
miss as weak or worthless regions of the world 
which do not strongly centralize and become 
international power players. This non-central-
izing attitude on the part of Canadians should 
not be taken as a weakness, but as a possible 
alternative from which Americans may learn. 
The discovery of Conservatism in the 
Canadian mindset might be left as a free stand-
ing point of consideration. But some authors 
such as Hartz and Horowitz have gone beyond 
the observation of Canadian Conservatism to 
further propose Canada's possible future as a 
strongly Socialist country. Hartz's theory that 
both Liberalism and Conservatism are neces-
sary for the growth of organic Socialism and 
Horowitz's application of that idea to Canada 
have already been mentioned. To enter into a 
full-blown discussion of Canadian socialism 
here would push this article far beyond its 
bounds. It will have to suffice to suggest the 
possibility of a real Canadian Socialism, and 
perhaps discuss some of the contributions 
which Canadians have made to the world 
Socialist canon. 
A Canadian Critique 
In Canada, Socialist thought is alive, well, 
and a welcome part of the public forum. In the 
1960s and '70s the Socialist thinker and teacher 
C.B. Macpherson was known and respected by 
the Canadian media and government, as well as 
by his academic peers. Macpherson, who is 
regarded as one of the most influential Socialist 
writers of the century, constructed among other 
things a thorough and as yet unanswered 
(though many have tried) critique of Western 
Liberalism. Detailing this with any hope of suc-
cess is impossible here, but an illustration of 
one of Macpherson's non-Liberal viewpoints 
might prove enlightening. 
In a collection of essays entitled 
Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, 
Macpherson touches upon the issue of scarcity 
of the means of life, which is an axiom proffered 
in every beginning economics class. Like Marx, 
Macpherson is fascinated by the potentialities 
of modern technology. Macpherson suggests 
that the increase in productivity experienced by 
the world's more advanced countries is enough 
to end the perceived economic problem of 
scarcity of the means of life, provided that peo-
ple focus upon a few ideological assumptions. 
He says: "The difficulty to be overcome within 
the advanced liberal democracies is not pri-
marily material but ideological." (Macpherson, 
p. 63) For, he continues, our present thinking 
"contains the assumption, inherited from clas-
sical Liberal individualism, that man is essen-
tially an infinite consumer. It is only on the lat-
ter assumption that scarcity is permanent. We 
should be able to see that scarcity, whatever it 
was for many millennia, is not an invariable 
natural phenomenon but a human construc-
tion." (Macpherson, p. 63) As a Socialist writer, 
Macpherson urges us to question some of the 
most fundamental assumptions in our lives, and 
it is only natural that someone outside the 
Liberal sphere of thought should do this. Only 
by hearing the ideas of someone outside our 
own ideological frame of reference can we real-
ize that our ideas are not fixed, absolute, or 
Right. They are part of an ongoing dialogue. To 
Macpherson society is not simply an impedi-
ment. Rather he realizes that if we are to build 
a better society, we must synthesize a belief sys-
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tern which does away with present hindrances 
while finding new avenues for our creativity. 
(Macpherson, p. 43) And so Macpherson, for 
those who can face change, proposes a chal-
lenge, not only to our positions on scarcity as 
in the following quote, but to our perceptions 
as a whole: "The most advanced problem now 
is not to redistribute scarcity but to see through 
it: to see that it is not an invariable natural phe-
nomenon but a variable cultural one. Scarcity 
of the means of life, then, is a socially variable 
impediment." (Macpherson, p. 63) 
Conclusions 
In this essay an often neglected or misused 
tool for analysis has been applied to the 
Canadian-American situation: the concept of 
ideology. Through ideological analysis, many 
of the assumptions that have lurked in the 
minds of North Americans for decades can be 
illuminated. Furthermore, ideology can be 
used to link seemingly unrelated traits, such as 
the Canadian lack of violence and the Canadian 
declaration of martial law. Ottawa's relative 
indifference to Quebec's threatened secession 
has been seen from a new angle, as has the 
inability of Americans to understand and cope 
with un-American phenomena by some means 
other than domination. 
Canada remains an enigma. The country 
is clearly not what Americans and Western 
Europeans like to think of as "normal." A dis-
cussion of Canadian Conservatism has provid-
ed new understanding of Canada's traits and 
habits. Those who have simply assumed that 
Canada, like the United States, is a Liberal coun-
try have been challenged on a basic level. 
Canadian regionalism has been highlighted, and 
its ideological foundation discussed. But more 
importantly, a picture of Canada as a dynamic, 
vital, and unique society has hopefully emerged 
from this exposition. Because Canada contains 
a mix of ideologies, its own ideology will tend 
to evolve more rapidly than that of the mono-
ideological United States. Already Socialism, 
seen by many as the ideological successor to 
Liberalism, just as Liberalism succeeded 
Conservatism in the 17th and 18th centuries, is 
taking shape as an important component of the 
emerging ideology of Canada. 
For Americans, ideological analysis poses 
a serious challenge. This will be viewed by 
many as a serious threat, or more likely, 
because of the immense power of the United 
States' mass-culture and economy, it will be 
ignored. Americans tend to be mono-ideolog-
ical, and like the big gradeschooler on the play-
ground, will take the path of least resistance, 
heedless of the damage they do to others, or 
even of the potential those others have as true 
friends. In a recent newspaper article, a White 
House spokesperson threatened a blockade of 
Cuba: "That's obviously one of the options that 
we would look at in the future as we see 
whether or not Castro begins to make some 
legitimate movement toward democracy." 
(Fowler, p. A-I) Why do Americans feel justi-
fied in forcing Cuba towards their form of gov-
ernment, without even asking the Cuban peo-
ple? Again, this attitude is symptomatic of 
mono-ideological culture. When someone or 
something does resist the American worldview, 
Americans chafe noticeably. The same situa-
tion exists in a more subtle form in Canada. 
Canada is a vital culture, and potentially very 
different culture from America. With no effort, 
in fact simply by following its natural inclina-
tion, the U.S. could make Canada just like itself 
in a matter of decades. Americans are only now 
beginning to wake up to the damage its com-
panies have done to the world ecology. The next 
challenge is to realize the damage they are 
doing in the realm of ideas: simply put, to be 
open, to learn and to grow. 
Canadians, for their part, especially the 
Anglophones, must realize the value and 
uniqueness of their own culture, or it could go 
the way of the dodo. The Anglophone Canadian 
problem is that American Liberalism certainly 
is a part of their heritage, and the most mod-
ern part; but this has the effect of burying those 
things that make them unique. Because they 
are infected by the mono-ideological culture of 
Americanism, many Anglophone Canadians 
have given up hope of finding uniqueness in 
themselves, or are tired of wondering about dif-
ferences that seem to make no sense. But this 
process of discovery is rather important. If 
Canadians begin to discover their own ideolog-
ical uniqueness and realize its potential, the 
results could prove very interesting indeed. 
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